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John J. Worley∗ 
Deliberative constitutionalists propose an account of democracy 
combining the principles of constitutionalism with those of deliberative 
democracy, but they have not adequately considered whether deliberative 
and constitutional ideals are logically compatible. This Article explains 
how these rival conceptions of democracy can be reconciled. It first 
describes the basic principles of constitutionalism and of deliberative 
democracy. It then discusses two putative contradictions between 
constitutional and deliberative principles suggested by the rhetoric of 
deliberative democracy. Neither presents any genuine contradiction, 
however, because one depends on a mischaracterization of 
constitutionalism, the other on an expendable tenet of deliberative 
democracy. The Article also addresses the contradiction between 
constitutionalism’s commitment to entrenched individual rights and 
deliberative democracy’s insistence on the provisionality of political 
decisions. After considering several unacceptable strategies for dissolving 
this conflict, the Article concludes that deliberative constitutionalism 
can be coherent, provided it permits the alteration of entrenched 
constitutional rights only by means of the more exacting methods 
ordinarily required for constitutional amendment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Democratic principles enjoy greater prestige today than perhaps 
at any time in the history of political ideas, yet democratic theorists 
still disagree about the meaning and justification of democratic ideals 
and about what legal, political, and social institutions those ideals 
require.1 Three rival conceptions of democracy have been especially 
influential among modern theorists. Procedural democrats 
emphasize popular sovereignty and majority rule as the best 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am grateful to George Sher for his 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. See generally FRANK CUNNINGHAM, THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (2002); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2006). 
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technique for achieving it, allowing only for those individual rights 
necessary for guaranteeing the fairness and integrity of democratic 
processes.2 Constitutional democrats accord priority to those 
institutions, practices, and rights that protect individuals against 
majoritarian excesses by imposing constraints on popular decision 
making.3 Deliberative democrats underscore the ideal of achieving 
the reasoned agreement of free and equal citizens and so advocate 
political decisions issuing from the public deliberation of citizens.4 
 
 2. Some procedural democrats adopt an entirely methodological view of democracy, 
eschewing any concern about substantive outcomes. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (5th ed. 1976) (characterizing democracy as 
“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people’s vote”). But others who 
emphasize that democracy should be understood in procedural terms are also willing to 
recognize constraints on democratic processes necessary to achieve popular will. See, e.g., 
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 175 (1989) (stating that the right to the 
democratic process is “a claim to all the general and specific rights. . . . that are necessary to it, 
from freedom of speech, press, and assembly to the right to form opposition political parties”); 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 874 (1980) 
(advocating a “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach” to constitutional 
adjudication); Brian Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: 
FIFTH SERIES 155, 156–57 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979) (explaining that 
democracy should be understood in procedural terms, without “any constraints on the content 
of the outcomes produced,” except for those required by democracy itself as a procedure). 
 3. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23–24 (1996) (stating that the constitutional conception of 
democracy presupposes “the conditions of moral membership in a political community”); 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977) (“The Constitution, and 
particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups against 
certain decisions that a majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts 
in what it takes to be the general or common interest.”); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1367 (3d ed. 2000) (“ [T]here is simply no way for courts to review 
legislation in terms of the Constitution without repeatedly making difficult substantive choices 
among competing values, and indeed among inevitably controverted political, social, and 
moral conceptions.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 4 (1985) 
(“[C]onstitutional interpretation is a practice . . . laden with content.”); Terrance Sandalow, 
Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184 (1977) (“[C]onstitutional law 
must now be understood as the means by which effect is given to those ideas that from time to 
time are held to be fundamental . . . .”). 
 4. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1994) (“[T]he key to the 
reconciliation of these apparently contradictory intentions—to restrain popular majorities but 
also to effectuate majority rule—lies in the framers’ broad purpose to empower deliberative 
majorities at the expense of uninformed, immoderate, or passionate majorities.”); JAMES S. 
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 36 (1991) (“Political equality without deliberation 
is not of much use, for it amounts to nothing more than power without the opportunity to 
think about how that power ought to be exercised.”); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 50 (1996) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT] 
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Recently, some theorists—I will call them “deliberative 
constitutionalists”5—have sought to combine constitutional and 
deliberative principles by developing an account of deliberative 
democracy within the context of a liberal constitutional framework.6 
On first consideration the deliberative constitutionalist project 
would not appear to be a promising one, for the theoretical 
commitments of constitutionalism and of deliberative democracy 
seem to be in tension, if not utterly incompatible, with one another. 
Surprisingly, legal and political theorists have paid scant attention to 
whether the ideals of constitutionalism and deliberative democracy 
can be combined without contradiction. As Samuel Freeman has 
observed: 
 
(“Deliberative democracy aspires to a politics in which citizens and their accountable 
representatives, along with other public officials, are committed to making decisions that they 
can justify to everyone bound by them.”); Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation 
Day, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2002) (proposing a “deliberation day” in connection with 
presidential elections in which samples of 500 citizens would assemble in local schools and 
halls to deliberate over the choice of candidates); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model 
of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES 
OF THE POLITICAL 69 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (“According to the deliberative model of 
democracy, it is a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to 
collective decision-making processes in a polity that the institutions of this polity are so 
arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of 
collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals.”); 
James Bohman, The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 400, 401 
(1998) (Deliberative democracy is “any one of a family of views according to which the public 
deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision-making and 
self-government.”); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
185, 186 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Democracy and Liberty] (“According to a 
deliberative conception, a decision is collective just in case it emerges from arrangements of 
binding collective choice that establish conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are 
governed by the decisions.”). 
 5. The label “deliberative constitutionalist” appears to originate from Bohman, supra 
note 4, at 414. 
 6. Some prominent works blending constitutional and deliberative ideals include 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); JURGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF 
LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1998); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING 
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING 
DEMOCRACY]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION]; Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in 
American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 
291 (1989); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989). 
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[One] issue that needs further clarification is whether and if so how 
the deliberative ideal is consistent with constitutional limits on 
democratic decisions, such as separation of powers, a bill of rights, 
and judicial review. This is one way into further discussion of the 
larger question of the relationship between deliberative and 
constitutional democracy. Are the two compatible (as Rawls and 
Michelman contend), or do they stand in opposition with one 
another (as others seem to maintain)?7 
The question of the compatibility of constitutionalism and 
deliberative democracy holds more than merely theoretical interest; if 
they are contradictory, it is no more possible to establish legal, 
political, and social institutions on the model of deliberative 
constitutionalism than it is to build a fenced enclosure on the model 
of a square circle. 
This Article aims to show that, contrary appearances 
notwithstanding, deliberative and constitutional principles are 
logically coherent. Part II briefly describes the core tenets of 
constitutionalism and of deliberative democracy. Part III then 
identifies and evaluates two apparent contradictions between the 
principles that emerge from the rhetoric that theorists sometimes 
employ to distinguish liberal constitutionalism from deliberative 
democracy. It argues that neither putative inconsistency poses any 
genuine contradiction, in one case because it depends on a 
misconception of constitutionalism, in the other because it depends 
on a prominent but expendable feature of deliberative democracy. 
Part IV addresses a more serious concern—the apparent conflict 
between the priority deliberative democracy accords to popular 
decision-making processes and the priority constitutional democracy 
accords to antecedently established substantive rights. After 
considering and rejecting several possible strategies for resolving this 
inconsistency, Part IV argues that a modest amendment to the ideals 
of deliberative democracy will render them compatible with 
constitutional principles; with that amendment, the deliberative 
constitutionalist project can go forward without risk of incoherence. 
 
 7. Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFFAIRS 371, 417 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Sympathetic Comment]. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND OF 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Both constitutionalism and deliberative democracy are complex 
ideals taking a variety of forms, and there are no canonical statements 
of either. Since our concern is to discover whether the deliberative 
constitutionalist project is coherent, not whether some particular 
version of constitutionalism is compatible with some particular 
version of deliberative democracy, we need accounts of both 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy that are broad enough 
to be informative about whether their principles are logically 
consistent but specific enough to preserve their distinctive claims. To 
avoid being tendentious or question-begging, in what follows I 
provide minimalist accounts of constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy that seek only to identify the essential features of these 
two rival conceptions of democracy. 
A. Constitutionalism 
Presently almost every nation-state has a constitution; with rare 
exceptions that constitution is embodied in a formal, written 
document.8 In general, constitutions establish the forms and 
institutions of government, so it is possible to think of a constitution 
as nothing more than that set of rules defining a community’s 
political institutions. As many writers on constitutionalism have 
recognized, such a broad understanding would entail that almost 
every state, even a dictatorship, has a constitution and that virtually 
all states are constitutional states.9 
 
 8. Nations having constitutions today even include those with military governments 
(like Libya, Myanmar, and Sudan), theocratic governments (like Iran), and communist 
governments (like China, North Korea, and Vietnam). 
 9. See, e.g., Atilio A. Boron, Latin America: Constitutionalism and the Political 
Traditions of Liberalism and Socialism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: 
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 339, 339 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 
1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY] (noting “the wide gap dividing 
Latin America’s history of constitutions and the weakness of its constitutionalist tradition”); 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African 
Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 65, 65–66 (observing 
“the simultaneous existence of what appears as a clear commitment by African political elites to 
the idea of the constitution and an equally emphatic rejection of the . . . liberal democratic 
notion of constitutionalism”). 
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Most constitutionalists, however, do not have in mind any such 
capacious conception. Instead, the idea of constitutionalism is more 
properly regarded as the view that government can and should be 
limited in its powers and that its authority depends on its observing 
those limitations. As the historian Charles H. McIlwain puts it, “All 
constitutional government is by definition limited government. . . . 
[C]onstitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation 
on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is 
despotic government, the government of will instead of law.”10 This 
understanding of constitutionalism highlights three essential features: 
(1) the supremacy principle, (2) the limited government principle, 
and (3) the entrenchment principle. 
The supremacy principle holds that the government itself should 
be subjected to the governance of law.11 It recognizes that the values 
secured by subjecting individual citizens to rules that both constrain 
and guide their conduct can also be achieved by applying the rule of 
law to the state.12 For example, Article VI of the United States 
Constitution explicitly proclaims it to be “the supreme Law of the 
 
 10. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 
21–22 (rev. ed. 1947). This understanding of constitutionalism as limited government is 
widely held. See, e.g., CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 35 (1950); Stephen L. 
Elkin, Constitutionalism: Old and New, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY 20 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan 
eds., 1993); Harvey Wheeler, Constitutionalism, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 36 
(Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975). For a view accepting that 
constitutionalism refers to constraint of the coercive power of the government but denying 
McIlwain’s view that it consists of legal constraints, see SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE 
STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY (1999). Gordon argues that 
the historical key to constitutionalism is the recognition that “power can only be controlled by 
power.” Id. at 15. 
 11. MCILWAIN, supra note 10, at 21 (“[C]onstitutionalism has one essential quality: it 
is a legal limitation on government . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) 
(“[Y]ou must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”); C.L. Ten, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, in A 
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 394, 394 (Robert E. Goodin & 
Philip Pettit eds., 1995) (“Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law are related ideas about how 
the powers of government and of state officials are to be limited.”); Harvey Wheeler, The 
Foundations of Constitutionalism, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975) (“[C]onstitutionalism 
. . . purports to guarantee that [the] attributes of law and government will be achieved in 
accordance with the ‘rule of law.’”). 
 12. Substantive constitutional provisions function as constraints both by limiting and by 
empowering. See Randall G. Holcombe, Constitutions As Constraints: A Case Study of Three 
American Constitutions, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 303, 303 (1991). 
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Land,” thereby identifying itself as the single law having special 
status as the paramount or fundamental law.13 The most general 
purpose served by constitutions is reducing the dangers posed by the 
state.14 Constitutions can restrict the state’s reach by specifying just 
what it may and may not do, so they may circumscribe the state’s 
power either by defining an exclusive grant of public power or by 
removing from its control certain privileged private activities.15 Also, 
a constitution may further cabin state power by providing a guide for 
legislation and for the interpretation of legislation, so that an 
ordinary law that conflicts with the constitution is invalid or 
inapplicable. But constitutions also reduce the power of the state 
simply by virtue of its announcing in advance the rules by which the 
government will operate.16 Constitutions protect the arena for 
individual planning and action by imposing publicly accessible rules 
governing the sources, the procedures, and the extent of public 
power, thereby providing a measure of regularity and predictability 
that enables people to arrange their affairs with confidence about the 
potential for state intervention. In short, a constitution that both 
restricts the powers of the state and antecedently announces the 
scope of state authority in effect extends the principle of the “rule of 
law” to the power of lawmaking itself.17 
The limited government principle requires institutional 
mechanisms both limiting the arbitrary exercise of state power and 
recognizing individual rights and freedoms.18 A constitution thus will 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 14. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 177–79 (1960); Walter F. Murphy, 
Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 9, at 3, 5–6. 
 15. Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism, 60 REV. INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS 
11, 12–13 (1998) [hereinafter Henkin, Elements].  
 16. Daniel S. Lev, Social Movements, Constitutionalism, and Human Rights: Comments 
from the Malaysian and Indonesian Experiences, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 9, at 139, 139–140. 
 17. JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISTONI, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 5–6 (5th ed. 2003); Louis 
Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 39, 40–42 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) [hereinafter Henkin, A New Birth]; 
Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001). 
 18. See, e.g., J. Roland Pennock, Epilogue, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 377, 379 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (“Certain things, [constitutionalism] holds, no 
government should be permitted to do . . . .”). 
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specify some set of procedural and substantive rules or norms that 
clearly limit the government’s arbitrary exercise of power by 
establishing institutional mechanisms concerning the allocation and 
the exercise of governmental power and by protecting individual 
rights and freedoms.19 Constitutionalists may disagree about just 
which institutions are essential to limited government and the 
prevention of tyranny. Institutions frequently mentioned as necessary 
include the separation of governmental powers, checks and balances 
among the different branches of government, federalism, 
bicameralism, and an independent judiciary with judicial review. But 
few governments would qualify as constitutional if we were to insist 
that a constitutional government must have all of these institutions, 
and selecting any particular subset of them is likely either to be 
arbitrary or to implicate some tacit normative judgment. It is 
preferable, therefore, to say only that constitutionalism requires some 
institutional constraints on the procedures regulating public life—
which may include the separation of powers, checks and balances, 
federalism, and the like—and to recognize that a government may be 
strongly or weakly constitutional to the extent that its constitution 
contains more or fewer of these constraints. 
Constitutionalism similarly implies an obligation of the 
government to respect and to protect individual rights, and 
constitutions frequently include a bill of rights. There is a substantial 
measure of consensus that some individual rights deserve 
constitutional protection, but widespread disagreement remains over 
just which rights must be recognized. Freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, a right to due process, 
equality and equal protection of the law, the right to life, a right of 
liberty and security of person, rights to property and to economic 
enterprise, economic and social rights (like rights to work and to 
adequate food, housing, health care, and education), and workers’ 
rights all find protection within some constitutional schemes. But, 
again, rather than trying to identify just which specific rights must be 
protected for a government to qualify as constitutional, it is better to 
require only that a constitution include some specific strictures on 
 
 19. HAYEK, supra note 14, at 182–86; Henkin, Elements, supra note 15, at 13–19; 
Henkin, A New Birth, supra note 17, at 40–42; Murphy, supra note 14, at 5–6; Okoth-
Ogendo, supra note 9, at 65, 67; Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 1307. 
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the content of laws designed to prevent the state from encroaching 
upon certain individual interests. 
Another essential feature of constitutionalism is that the rules 
imposing limits on government power must be “entrenched.” The 
entrenchment principle holds that the constitutional limitations on 
state power cannot be subject to change by recourse to routine 
political processes.20 Constitutionalism does not deny the propriety 
of formal, and perhaps even informal, mechanisms for effecting 
constitutional change. Nevertheless, it does presuppose that the 
process by which the constitution can be amended must be more 
onerous and more demanding than that provided for modifying or 
repealing ordinary legislation. Thus, one basic function of a 
constitution in a democracy is to put certain decisions—especially 
those relating to constitutionally guaranteed individual rights and 
liberties—beyond ordinary democratic processes. As Justice Robert 
Jackson put it in a celebrated opinion: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them 
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, 
liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.21 
So, while ordinary laws may be modified or repealed by the 
legislature or declared illegal or unconstitutional by the judiciary, the 
legislature has no power to modify or repeal the constitution 
unilaterally, and the judiciary has no power to declare the 
constitution itself illegal.22 
Of course, constitutions typically do provide for some process of 
constitutional revision or amendment that is initiated by or requires 
 
 20. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 97–105; Aaron-Andrew P. 
Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 375 (2003); Wil Waluchow, Constitutionalism, in 
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2004 ed.), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/ constitutionalism/. 
 21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 22. The United Kingdom presents a special problem, since Parliament is legally free to 
enact whatever legislation it sees fit. For the view that the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty presents no greater threat to constitutionalism in the United Kingdom than does 
the flexible amendatory provisions in other constitutions, see Giovanni Sartori, 
Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 853–857 (1962). 
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participation by the organs of government whose powers they limit, 
but those processes invariably require something more than a routine 
governmental decision to effect a change. Sometimes they require 
constitutional assemblies;23 supermajority votes;24 referenda;25 or, in a 
federal system, some agreement between the central government and 
some number or proportion of regional governments.26 Whatever 
the mechanism, the controlling idea is that the constitutional 
amendment process should be insulated from the ordinary political 
process, so that the organs of government whose powers are limited 
by the constitution are not entitled to change or to repeal those 
limitations. In part, constitutional entrenchment facilitates a degree 
of stability over time. As James Madison argued in connection with 
the ratification of the United States Constitution, frequent recourse 
to amendment would undermine the stability of government, 
because it would imply that the constitution was seriously defective.27 
More importantly, however, the constitution’s relative invulnerability 
to change is arguably a requirement for the very possibility of 
 
 23. For example, the Bulgarian Constitution calls for an amending convention called by 
the National Assembly upon a two-thirds vote of all members in order to amend certain of its 
provisions, including those establishing the state structure or form of government, preserving 
the inviolability of human rights, defining the territory of the republic, and providing for 
amendment of the constitution. KONSTITUTSIYA [Constitution] ch. 9, art. 158 (Bulg.). 
 24. Supermajoritarian requirements are very common, but they may vary in stringency. 
In Germany, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds vote by both houses, must be 
clearly stated, and cannot affect certain provisions of the Basic Law. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] 
[Constitution] art. 79 (F.R.G.). In Bulgaria, the National Assembly may amend the 
constitution only by a three-fourths vote of all members, with three different ballots taken on 
three different days and with at least one month passing between initiation and the first vote. 
KONSTITUTSIYA [Constitution] ch. 9, art. 155 (Bulg.). 
 25. See, e.g., 1958 CONST. 89 (Fr.) (referendum following passage by both Houses of 
Parliament in identical terms); COSTITUZIONE [COST] [Constitution] art. 138 (Italy) 
(referendum after adoption by each of the two chambers of parliament twice within no less 
than three months and approval of a majority of each chamber in the second vote). 
 26. In Canada, the constitution generally can be amended by resolutions of the Senate 
and House of Commons together with the agreement by resolution of the legislatures of at 
least two-thirds of the provinces having in the aggregate at least fifty percent of the population 
of all the provinces. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. V, § 38(1). Amendments that 
derogate from the legislative powers or rights of the provincial governments also require the 
consent of the provincial legislature to be effective in the province. Id. at §§ 38(2), 38(3). 
Certain amendments—including amendments to the Office of the Queen, the representation 
of the provinces in the House of Commons, the composition of the Supreme Court, and the 
amending procedure—require unanimous consent of the provinces. Id. at § 41. But only the 
Parliament can amend provisions relating to the executive government or the Senate and 
House of Commons. Id. at § 44. 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
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constitutional government: the constitutional limitations on state 
power would be ineffective and meaningless if the government were 
free to unilaterally alter, amend, or eliminate those limitations. 
Understood in this way, the constitutionalist’s commitment to 
limiting state power by legal means necessitates the entrenchment 
principle. 
B. Deliberative Democracy 
Broadly conceived, deliberative democracy holds that public 
deliberation of free and equal citizens is the basis for legitimate 
political decision making and self-government. As Jon Elster writes, 
There is a robust core of phenomena that count as deliberative 
democracy . . . . All agree, I think, that the notion includes 
collective decision making with the participation of all who will be 
affected by the decision . . . . Also, all agree that it includes decision 
making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who 
are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality . . . .28 
But what animates deliberative democracy is not merely 
promoting the public discussion of political affairs. Instead, 
deliberative democracy affirms the centrality of deliberative decision 
making, which appeals to “reasons that should be accepted by free 
and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.”29 Four salient 
principles emerge from the various accounts of deliberative 
democracy: (1) the common good principle, (2) the public reason 
principle, (3) the preference transformation principle, and (4) the 
egalitarian principle.30 
The common good principle provides that citizens and other 
political decision makers should deliberate about which among the 
competing proposals under consideration will best advance the 
common good. Deliberative democrats commonly distinguish the 
deliberative model of democracy from interests-oriented or 
 
 28. Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 1, 8. 
 29. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 
(2004) [hereinafter WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?]. 
 30. Philip Pettit provides a somewhat different account. See Philip Pettit, Deliberative 
Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 138, 139–140 (James Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Philip Pettit, 
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 268, 269–271 (2001) 
[hereinafter Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma]. 
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aggregative models of democratic decision making. Under the so-
called aggregative model, democratic processes operate like 
commercial market transactions.31 Citizens reflect on their individual 
and group interests, evaluate how the competing policy options will 
likely affect those interests, and then select the measures they believe 
best advance those interests. The electoral system simply 
mechanically aggregates individuals’ brute preferences in the hope of 
achieving a utilitarian optimal result.32 The aggregative model 
expects each voter to register his own considered preferences where 
those preferences presumably reflect his mainly private and self-
interested concerns, and the political aggregation of those 
preferences is calculated to maximize overall preference satisfaction.33 
Under the bargaining model of democratic decision making, citizens 
also act on the basis of their personal preferences, but they express 
those preferences in sequences of bargaining offers. The offers each 
person makes are designed to guarantee that he was obliged to make 
only the minimal concessions to others necessary for promoting his 
own purposes.34 
Deliberative democracy rejects both the priority of individual 
self-interest and the mechanical process-orientation reflected in the 
aggregative and bargaining conceptions of democracy. Instead, the 
hallmark of deliberative democracy is that it requires voters to 
deliberate about how they should vote on the basis of their impartial 
judgments as to what best conduces to the common good rather 
than on the basis of what best advances their own individual or 
group interests.35 In deliberating about matters of public concern, 
democratic citizens and their elected representatives must distance 
themselves from their own personal or group interests and 
impartially adopt laws, policies, and institutions that promote the 
 
 31. James Bohman & William Rehg, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, at ix, ix–xii (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997). 
 32. Freeman, Sympathetic Comment, supra note 7, at 373–75. 
 33. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 19–21 (2000); Cohen, 
Democracy and Liberty, supra note 4, at 185–87; David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and 
Social Choice, 40 POL. STUD. 54, 55 (1992). 
 34. See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 3, 4. 
 35. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 67, 75–76 [hereinafter 
Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy]; Miller, supra note 33, at 56. 
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interests of all citizens.36 Political actors should be concerned with 
what is best for society as a whole.37 For the deliberative democrat, 
the goal of deliberation is not the narrow pursuit of one’s self-
interest, but rather the identification of measures that, as far as 
possible, answer to the needs and interests of all citizens.38 
The public reason principle requires a public process in which the 
members of the political community participate in public discussion 
and critical examination of collectively binding public policies.39 Of 
course, deliberative democrats reject the notion that citizens privately 
form their own judgments about perceived common interests and 
then vote on the basis of those judgments. But what distinguishes 
deliberative from other conceptions of democracy is not public 
discussion as such, since under any view of democracy voters can 
benefit from sharing information with one another. Instead, whether 
a democratic theory is deliberative depends not only on whether 
there is joint deliberation among citizens, but also on the kinds of 
considerations they recognize as good reasons in democratic 
discussion and decision making. Public deliberation provides 
deliberative democracy with its conception of political legitimacy.40 
The idea is that, in a democratic society characterized by a plurality 
of moral, religious, and philosophical views, merely giving everyone’s 
interests equal consideration is not enough to justify political 
decisions. Political justification also calls for public deliberation in 
terms of reasons that free and equal citizens can reasonably accept.41 
Since consent of the governed is at the heart of democratic 
decision making, the legitimacy of deliberative outcomes is derived 
not simply from the will of the majority, but instead from the results 
of collectively reasoned reflection by political equals engaged in a 
shared project of identifying laws and public policies that respect the 
 
 36. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 407, 420–
21 [hereinafter Cohen, Procedure and Substance]. 
 37. Freeman, Sympathetic Comment, supra note 7, at 372–76. 
 38. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 24–39, 185–92; 
Elster, supra note 34, at 2; Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, supra 
note 30, at 269–71. 
 39. See generally HELD, supra note 1, at 237–38. 
 40. See MICHAEL SAWARD, DEMOCRACY 120–24 (2003). 
 41. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 79–94; Cohen, 
Procedure and Substance, supra note 36, at 414–18; Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, supra note 
4, at 203. 
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interests, preferences, and values of all citizens.42 Reasonable persons 
holding different moral, religious, and philosophical views are 
entitled to be given reasons for the laws, institutions, and policies 
that affect them which they can regard as acceptable from the 
perspective of their own comprehensive views.43 If they are not given 
such reasons, they are not treated as equals in the democratic 
decision-making process.44 Laws, institutions, and policies adopted 
according to reasons peculiar to a particular comprehensive view—
reasons that many democratic citizens cannot reasonably be expected 
to endorse—are thus unjustified. The coercive powers of the state 
would be exercised against citizens on grounds they do not find 
reasonable or that they cannot as free and equal citizens endorse. 
The political legitimacy of the outcomes of public deliberation is 
thus located in the fact that the deliberations are guided by the use 
of publicly scrutinized reasons.45 
 The preference transformation principle maintains that citizens 
and others engaged in deliberative democratic decision making must 
be willing to evaluate critically and to change their own preferences 
and values.46 Again, deliberative democrats contrast this view with 
that represented by other aggregative or interest-based conceptions 
of democracy: 
Interest-based conceptions of democracy consider democracy 
primarily as a process of expressing one’s preferences and demands, 
and registering them in a vote. . . . By contrast, the model of 
deliberative democracy conceives of democracy as a process that 
creates a public, citizens coming together to talk about collective 
problems, goals, ideals, and actions. . . . Instead of reasoning from 
the point of view of the private utility maximizer, through public 
 
 42. WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 29, at 3–5. 
 43. Id. at 133–35, 144–47; YOUNG, supra note 33, at 25. 
 44. Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, supra note 4, at 205–06. 
 45. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 52–69; Benhabib, 
supra note 4, at 69–70; Cohen, Procedure and Substance, supra note 36, at 419–22. 
 46. See SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 8 (“A central point of 
deliberation . . . is to shape both preferences and beliefs, and frequently to alter them . . . .”); 
Thomas Christiano, The Significance of Public Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 243, 244–46 (“Public deliberation 
transforms, modifies, and clarifies the beliefs and preferences of the citizens of a political 
society.”); Elster, Introduction, supra note 28, at 5–7 (Deliberation “aims at the 
transformation of preferences” rather than merely the aggregation of preferences.). See 
generally HELD, supra note 1, at 232–34. 
WORLEY.MRO 3/13/2009 9:17 AM 
431 Deliberative Constitutionalism 
 445 
deliberation citizens transform their preferences according to 
public-minded ends . . . .47 
According to deliberative democrats, interest-based models of 
democracy envision citizens entering into the political process with 
predetermined personal preferences they seek to advance by 
manipulating the instrumentalities of political decision making. 
Political actors do not expect that their preferences will undergo any 
change as a consequence of their political interactions, and the 
system of democratic decision making is not designed to facilitate 
such changes. Deliberative democracy, by contrast, contemplates 
that political decision makers enter the deliberative decision-making 
process open to preference transformation during the course of their 
political interactions.48 This commitment might be viewed as an 
outgrowth of deliberative democracy’s commitment to the ideal of 
public reason: as participants in the deliberative process, all citizens 
must be prepared to respond respectfully and with an open mind to 
the reasons offered by their fellow citizens. 
The egalitarian principle requires that all members of the 
political community are equally entitled to vote on how to resolve 
issues of collective concern. Deliberative democrats thus hold that 
many substantive rights and liberties, together with opportunities 
and egalitarian social institutions, also must be in place to make 
genuine democratic deliberation possible.49 To assure equal 
participation in the process of public deliberation, therefore, 
deliberative democrats typically endorse a broader view of the social 
and political conditions necessary for democratic decision making 
than do some proponents of purely procedural conceptions of 
democracy. For the latter, democracy is often no more than a 
political decision-making procedure that requires political rights like 
a universal franchise, the equal right to vote and hold office, and 
majority rule. They also may recognize some additional political 
rights—like freedom of political speech and freedom of the press—
but only to the extent they are necessary to establish and maintain 
 
 47. Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, 
in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 4, at 120, 120–21. 
 48. See SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 22–23; YOUNG, 
supra note 33, at 26. 
 49. See WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 29, at 102–10; Jack Knight & 
James Johnson, What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?, in DELIBERATIVE 
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the integrity of the democratic decision-making process. By contrast, 
deliberative theories generally recognize that deliberation not only 
must provide for procedural rights of political participation, but that 
it also must provide for additional substantive rights and liberties and 
certain social institutions to guarantee that citizens participate in 
democratic deliberation as equals.50 They insist that these stringent 
social and political conditions must be satisfied if citizens are to 
achieve a status as political equals who are free, and that these 
conditions must be in place if democratic citizens are to be in a 
position to discover and to vote for the common good.51 
Deliberative democrats do not agree on what social and political 
conditions are necessary for deliberation to take place. Although it 
would be inappropriate simply to stipulate what those conditions are 
for all versions of deliberative democracy, it is worth mentioning 
some of the kinds of rights deliberative democrats have claimed are 
necessary for deliberation just to get a sense of the breadth of those 
claims. Since deliberative democracy requires that the systematic 
considerations of the interests and needs of all citizens be ensured by 
providing an equal voice to all, some theorists emphasize removing 
institutional barriers to participation in public deliberation and 
developing accessible forums in which all citizens can freely 
participate in the deliberative process. Deliberative democrats 
therefore may recommend institutions like public financing of 
political campaigns and public provision of arenas of free political 
expression in order to guard against the political process being 
controlled by wealthy or powerful interests. Others claim that the 
requirement of political equality may entail the redistribution of 
power and of material resources in order to promote the equal 
opportunity of political influence and thereby economic rights like 
adequate work and educational opportunities and adequate health 
care. 
 
 50. See DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 52–69; James Bohman, 
Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities, 
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 321, 
321–23. 
 51. See, e.g., Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, supra note 4, at 205–06; Cohen, 
Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 35, at 67–92. 
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III. FALSE CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Democratic theorists often distinguish liberal constitutional 
accounts from deliberative accounts by focusing on the different 
roles individual preferences play in each of them. David Miller 
explains the contrast this way: 
In the liberal view, the aim of democracy is to aggregate individual 
preferences into a collective choice in as fair and efficient a way as 
possible. In a democracy there will be many different views as to 
what should be done politically, reflecting the many different 
interests and beliefs present in society. Each person’s preferences 
should be accorded equal weight. Moreover, preferences are 
sacrosanct because they reflect the individuality of each member of 
the political community . . . . The problem then is to find the 
institutional structure that best meets the requirements of equality 
and efficiency. . . . 
 The deliberative ideal also starts from the premise that political 
preferences will conflict and that the purpose of democratic 
institutions must be to resolve this conflict. But it envisages this 
occurring through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at 
stake with the aim of arriving at an agreed judgment. The process 
of reaching a decision will also be a process whereby initial 
preferences are transformed to take account of the views of others. 
That is, the need to reach an agreement forces each participant to 
put forward proposals under the rubric of general principles or 
policy considerations that others could accept.52 
This standard distinction between constitutional and deliberative 
democracy suggests that they are more than just strange bedfellows, 
but rather that they are, in fact, inconsistent. In the first place, the 
common good principle of deliberative democracy appears to conflict 
with constitutional principles. Deliberative democracy requires that 
decision makers act in accordance with their impartial judgments of 
what conduces to the common good of all citizens. The deliberative 
process is designed to encourage citizens, legislators, and other 
democratic decision makers to bracket their individual and group 
interests and to seek consensus over the common good. By contrast, 
constitutional democracy contemplates that citizens will reflect on 
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their individual or group interests, ascertain how competing policy 
proposals affect those interests, and then promote those policies they 
believe will best advance their interests. Since democratic decision 
makers act to promote their own individual or group interests, 
constitutional restraints on popular will are necessary to guard 
against the risk that self-interested persons might seek to turn public 
power to private advantage. 
In the second place, the preference transformation principle of 
deliberative democracy seems incompatible with constitutional 
principles. On the standard account, deliberative democrats maintain 
that citizens’ preferences must be open to transformation during the 
course of the political process. When citizens engage in the 
deliberative democratic process, they must be prepared to question 
and to change their own preferences, for the process of articulating 
reasons and offering them in public forums “forces the individual to 
think of what would count as a good reason for all others 
involved.”53 But constitutional democracy presupposes that citizens 
enter into the democratic decision-making process with 
predetermined preferences that remain fixed during the course of 
their political interactions. Citizens engage in democratic processes 
without any expectation that their preferences will change in the 
course of the process, and the processes themselves are designed 
merely to aggregate those individual preferences, not to encourage 
the transformation of those preferences. 
In fact, neither of these supposed contrasts poses any necessary 
inconsistency between constitutionalism and deliberative democracy. 
A. Constitutionalism and the Common Good 
The first supposed conflict—between acting from self-interest 
and acting from the common good—is ambiguous. It could be a 
claim that constitutionalism and deliberative democracy presuppose 
competing descriptions of what actually motivates political actors, or 
it could be a claim that the rival theories espouse contradictory views 
about the moral obligations of political actors. 
The descriptive version of this objection poses no obstacle for the 
deliberative constitutionalist project. A contradiction between the 
two views would arise only if deliberative democrats held that 
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political actors always are motivated by their impartial judgments 
about the common good or if constitutionalists held that political 
actors always are motivated by self-interest, but neither theory 
presupposes such an implausibly unqualified view of human 
motivation. To be sure, deliberative democrats probably are more 
sanguine than are constitutional democrats about the prospect that 
political actors will be able to put aside self-interest and act to 
promote what they impartially judge to be in the common interest. 
After all, one reason constitutional democrats accentuate the 
importance of constitutional limitations on government power is to 
protect against the risk that the self-interested majority will run 
roughshod over minority rights. But constitutionalism does not 
entail that self-interest always motivates political actors.  
Conversely, deliberative democrats certainly are committed to 
the view that citizens can and should be morally motivated by justice 
or the common good and be willing to abide by democratic 
decisions regarding these values. They assume, for example, that 
citizens can act from a commitment to deliberative institutions and 
the norms and principles generated by deliberation54 or from a 
commitment to reciprocity and public reason-giving.55 But these are 
not assumptions about the actual motivations that citizens have in 
real democratic societies so much as they are statements of the 
motivations political actors must have if the ideal of deliberative 
democracy is to be actualized. Indeed, any complete theory of 
deliberative democracy must provide some account of how to deal 
with those citizens who do not have the appropriate motivations or 
who altogether reject the ideal of democratic deliberation.56 There is 
certainly nothing inconsistent, however, in the deliberative 
democrat’s view of human motivation and his acceptance of the 
institutional constraints on popular will that constitutionalists 
recommend to counteract the pathologies that sometimes may 
adversely affect political decision-making processes. 
 
 54. Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 35, at 72. 
 55. DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 53; Frank I. Michelman, How 
Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 31, at 145, 149. 
 56. In fact, Gutmann and Thompson stipulate that deliberative democratic processes are 
appropriate only among those persons who are prepared to reason together in the right spirit. 
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The prescriptive version of the contrast between acting from self-
interest and acting from the common good is no more successful in 
showing any inconsistency between constitutional and deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative democracy is explicitly committed to the 
view that voters should cast their ballots in accordance with their 
estimates of what best conduces to justice or the common good, but 
there is no reason to suppose that constitutional democracy 
presupposes that voters should vote in accordance with their 
individual or group preferences. Perhaps some constitutional 
democrats do hold that the goal of democratic processes is merely to 
aggregate preferences and so would recommend that citizens should 
vote entirely in accordance with their individual or group 
preferences. But the preference-voting view is most congenial with a 
utilitarian defense of democracy that locates the value of democratic 
processes in their potential to maximize overall utility measured by 
reference to preference satisfaction. Conceived along the utility-
maximizing model, democratic processes perform a function 
comparable to economic markets.57 Citizens register their 
preferences by means of their votes, just as consumers register their 
preferences by means of their purchasing decisions. Democracy 
simply records and responds to individual preferences as expressed by 
the greater number of persons voting for a particular law or policy or 
candidate. Voting is not just a decision-making procedure. On this 
account, the aim of democracy is to maximize preference satisfaction, 
and voting provides the mechanism for revealing and expressing 
what preferences citizens have. 
But this utilitarian justification for democracy does not seem 
especially compelling. Apart from its commitment to preference 
satisfaction as the exclusive goal of government, the argument seems 
to justify no more than public opinion polling to determine citizen 
preferences. But, whatever the merits of this utilitarian defense of 
democracy generally, constitutional democracy does not necessarily 
depend on it. In fact, constitutional democracy appears to rest 
somewhat uneasily on utility-maximizing foundations. If the aim of 
democracy were to maximize preference satisfaction and the purpose 
of voting were simply to register citizens’ preferences, then there 
would be nothing undemocratic about collective decisions that 
operate for the benefit of the majority of citizens and to the 
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detriment of a minority. So, for example, racially discriminatory 
legislation adopted by a popular referendum might well maximize 
preference satisfaction, even though it does so at the expense of the 
minority race. But since constitutional democracy recognizes certain 
basic rights and liberties in order to protect minorities against the 
popular will, someone committed both to a preference-satisfaction 
defense of democracy and to constitutional limitations on democratic 
decision making will have to do some pretty fancy philosophical 
footwork. It would appear far more promising to justify 
constitutional democracy and its guarantees of individual rights and 
liberties on the grounds that it respects or promotes either the liberty 
or the equality of citizens better than any other kind of decision 
making than on the grounds that it maximizes preference 
satisfaction. 
Despite the impression created by the rhetoric of deliberative 
democracy, therefore, constitutional democracy is not incompatible 
with deliberative democracy’s common good principle. If that 
principle is a descriptive account of what actually motivates political 
actors, then deliberative democrats can accept that those actors 
sometimes will be driven by the kinds of self-interested 
considerations that justify the institutional restraints on 
governmental power that constitutional democrats recommend. If, 
instead, the common good principle is a moral requirement guiding 
the goals that political actors must pursue, then constitutional 
democracy does not run afoul of deliberative democracy’s demand 
that political actors promote the common good, since constitutional 
democracy is not committed to an individual preference-aggregation 
model of democratic decision making. Indeed, the most compelling 
justifications for constitutional democracy do not support the 
preference-aggregation approach. 
B. Constitutionalism and Preference Transformation 
The second supposed conflict between constitutional and 
deliberative democracy—that constitutional democracy assumes 
citizens engage in political interactions with predetermined 
preferences that remain unchanged, while deliberative democracy 
presupposes citizens’ preferences will be open to transformation as a 
result of their participation in the deliberative process—overstates the 
role of preference transformation in deliberative democracy. In 
deciding which competing law, policy, or candidate to support, a 
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citizen might attempt to determine which would best advance his 
own personal or group-oriented interests, or he might assess which 
of them would best advance the public interest. The standard 
account treats preferences as dispositions to choose those courses of 
action that promote one’s self—or group—interest. It then claims 
that constitutional democracy holds that voters seek to advance their 
individual preferences, whereas deliberative democracy maintains that 
voters should seek to promote the common good. But the standard 
account overlooks an important distinction: whether one’s judgment 
about what advances one’s self-interest remains fixed or changes 
during the course of political interactions and whether one should 
vote to promote one’s self-interest or to advance the common good 
are entirely separate questions. Whether the self-interested 
preferences of voters or other political actors remain fixed or 
undergo transformation during the political process is entirely 
irrelevant for any theory of political decision making that requires 
citizens to act in accordance with their best estimates of what will 
promote the common good. 
Deliberative democratic accounts, therefore, need not insist on 
the preference transformation principle. This claim may seem 
surprising; as already noted, deliberative democrats explicitly endorse 
the idea that citizens and other political decision makers engaged in 
the deliberative process must be open to questioning and revising 
their individual preferences. But there is no reason for citizens to be 
amenable to preference transformation if, as deliberative democracy 
holds, their obligation is to abstract from their individual or group 
preferences and to vote impartially for those laws, institutions, and 
policies that they sincerely judge best contribute to the common 
good.  
Consider a simple domestic example. Five people agree to share a 
house and meet to deliberate about and to adopt guidelines for their 
joint living arrangements. Three of the roommates are smokers and 
would personally prefer that smoking be permitted in the house, but 
the two non-smokers would prefer it to be a non-smoking residence. 
If everyone were to vote his individual preference, smoking would be 
permitted. But suppose that the residents do not vote their 
individual preferences but instead vote in accordance with their best 
estimates of what would be in the interests of all. Some or all of the 
smokers might well think that, despite their personal preferences for 
allowing smoking, a no-smoking rule would be in the best interests 
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of the small domestic community and thereby vote to prohibit 
smoking. By the same token, some or all of the non-smokers might 
judge that permitting smoking in the house would be in the 
common interest. In either case, those residents who do as 
deliberative democrats insist they must and put aside their own 
personal preferences and vote in favor of the house smoking policy 
they impartially judge will best promote the common interest need 
not undergo any change in their individual preferences. A smoker 
could consistently maintain his personal preference that smoking be 
permitted yet believe it would be better for all concerned that it not 
be, just as a non-smoker could without contradiction believe that 
allowing smoking would be best for the group but personally prefer 
that people not smoke inside. 
Deliberative democracy’s requirement that democratic decision 
makers promote the common good, therefore, is completely 
indifferent as to whether their individual preferences change or 
remain fixed during the deliberative process. In view of deliberative 
democracy’s commitment to the principle that political decision 
makers should vote for those measures they believe promote the 
common good rather than for those they think best advance their 
individual preferences, it is difficult to understand why preference 
transformation is such a pervasive feature of deliberative democratic 
accounts. In any event, to the extent that constitutional democracy 
also appeals to the common good, it too is indifferent as to whether 
individual preferences remain fixed or are subject to change. No 
conflict exists between deliberative and constitutional accounts of 
democracy, therefore, because, so long as both maintain that citizens 
and other political decision makers should decide on the basis of 
their impartial judgments of what is in the common interest, both 
will be equally indifferent as to whether personal preferences are 
mutable or fixed. 
Deliberative democrats may charge that I have mischaracterized 
what it is they claim must be subject to transformation during 
deliberative democratic processes, but no conflict between 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy arises under either of 
the two most plausible alternative interpretations of deliberative 
democracy. First, the deliberative democratic claim that those 
engaged in deliberative processes must be prepared to change their 
own preferences might just mean that decision makers must be 
amenable to shifting from a preference for advancing their self-
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interest to a preference for advancing the common interest. But if 
that is all the claim amounts to, it adds nothing to the deliberative 
democratic tenet that decision makers must put aside personal 
interests and act impartially for the good of all. As already shown, 
this claim poses no conflict between deliberative democracy and 
constitutionalism. Second, the preference transformation principle 
might mean that citizens and other political actors must be open and 
receptive to the reasons presented by others so that they are willing 
to change their minds about what is in the common interest and 
how best to achieve it. On this interpretation decision makers simply 
must be amenable to changing their judgments about the common 
good. But if this is what deliberative democrats mean by preference 
transformation, the claim is not especially distinctive. And, distinctive 
or not, it would give rise to a contradiction only if constitutionalism 
entailed the view that political actors should enter into the decision-
making process with a predetermined view of what is in the common 
good that does not change during political interactions, and 
constitutionalism certainly does not require any such view. 
In short, constitutionalism does not conflict with deliberative 
democracy’s preference transformation principle for two reasons. 
First, since deliberative democracy requires political actors to 
promote the common good, whether their individual preferences 
remain fixed or are mutable during the deliberative process makes no 
difference. The preference transformation principle, therefore, is an 
unnecessary feature of deliberative democratic theory. Second, to the 
extent that constitutional democracy also endorses the common-
good principle and rejects the preference-aggregation model of 
democratic decision making, it too is indifferent to whether the 
initial personal preferences of decision makers are transformed. 
Whether individual preferences are subject to revision during the 
course of political interactions is entirely irrelevant, so long as 
democratic decision makers are obliged to promote the public good 
rather than their individual self-interests. 
IV. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENTRENCHMENT 
The most serious source of tension between constitutionalism 
and deliberative democracy resides in their treatment of individual 
rights and liberties. Constitutionalism is committed to the idea that 
individuals have certain rights—freedom of speech and religion, 
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equality before the law, a right to own private property, and so on—
that lie beyond the scope of legitimate government action. A 
democratic constitution recognizes a set of entrenched rights that 
effectively take off the political agenda certain possible majoritarian 
initiatives. Constitutionalism thereby accords priority to certain basic 
rights and liberties over democratic decision-making processes. By 
contrast, the central idea of deliberative democracy is that of the 
people deliberating—the sovereign people engaged in public 
reasoning and argument about what laws, institutions, and social 
policies are required to achieve justice and the common good. For 
deliberative democrats, citizens should deliberate about specific 
governmental policies, but they also should deliberate about both 
the procedural mechanisms of democratic decision making and 
which values deserve constitutional protection. Thus, what rights 
should be regarded as fundamental is itself a subject for democratic 
deliberation and decision making. Deliberative democracy therefore 
accords priority to democratic decision-making processes over any 
privileged set of rights and liberties. 
Constitutionalism and deliberative democracy thus appear to 
have conflicting commitments. For constitutionalism, there are 
fundamental rights that ordinary political processes cannot abrogate; 
for deliberative democracy, what basic rights to recognize is itself a 
proper subject of democratic decision making, so that any particular 
right is vulnerable to abrogation following appropriate deliberative 
processes. The deliberative constitutionalist project thus appears to 
be a non-starter. On the one hand, if democratic deliberation must 
take place within the constraints of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, then citizens cannot deliberate over what fundamental values 
will be recognized. Instead, those values are imposed from outside 
the deliberative process. On the other hand, if citizens may 
deliberate about all important values and may decide whether to 
recognize certain rights, then those rights do not enjoy the 
entrenched status of constitutional rights. Instead, they are rights 
whose recognition is vulnerable to “the vicissitudes of political 
controversy.”58 
 
 58. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Referring to Seyla 
Benhabib’s attempt to blend constitutional and deliberative principles, Carol Gould puts the 
problem this way: 
Benhabib wants to have it both ways, then; for if the rights are really contestable, 
then one possibility has to be that they can be abrogated. Otherwise, contestation 
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The deliberative constitutionalist project will fail if this tension 
between constitutional and deliberative principles cannot be 
resolved. Constitutional rights cannot be both subject to democratic 
processes and insulated from them, so it appears that any democratic 
theory that is committed to both claims must be incoherent. I 
believe, however, that this tension can be resolved. My proposed 
reconciliation claims that the principles of deliberative democracy can 
recognize that constitutional rights be vulnerable to change only by 
means of the more demanding processes required for constitutional 
amendments and not by means of the ordinary political process. 
Before describing my proposal, however, I will consider several 
alternative strategies for harmonizing constitutional and deliberative 
principles that the deliberative constitutionalist might pursue. For a 
variety of reasons, each of these alternatives is unsatisfactory. 
A. Allocating Decision-Making Authority Versus Limiting 
Government 
First, let me consider one response to a related but distinct 
problem that recognizing constitutional rights is supposed to pose 
for democracy generally; namely, the so-called countermajoritarian 
dilemma. In American constitutional law, the question is most often 
posed as whether judicial review is consistent with democratic 
government. The objection is that, in declaring a law 
unconstitutional, an unelected court frustrates enforcement of a law 
that presumably reflects the will of the majority.59 But, if there is a 
 
reduces to differences of interpretation and that’s not what essential contestability 
means. But if they are not contestable, this means that they have their authority in 
something other than the discursive procedure of the genesis and validation of 
norms. Either the rights are contestable, or they are not. 
Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE, supra note 4, at 171, 178. 
 59. The classic account of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review in 
American constitutional law is James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). For two influential but distinctive 
defenses of the practice, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986) (1962), and 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 
(1960). See generally Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial 
Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327 (1991); Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Review and the Conditions of 
Democracy, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 335 (1998); articles printed in 22 LAW & PHIL., nos. 3–4 (2003) 
(providing various perspectives on the interaction between judicial review, democracy, and 
constitutionalism). For the relationship between four contemporary theories of constitutional 
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genuine problem here it is not just whether judicial review is 
antidemocratic; instead, the question is whether constitutionalism 
itself is compatible with democratic rule. One classic textbook 
explains the tension between majoritarian politics and 
constitutionally entrenched restraints in the following terms: 
[T]here must necessarily be some formula or mechanism for the 
making of decisions or the selection of policies. In a democracy this 
formula is majority rule. . . . But democracy has to recognize that a 
majority can become a tyranny which may ruthlessly destroy the 
rights of minorities temporarily at its mercy. . . . Thus there must 
be a balancing of majority power and minority rights. This is the 
most difficult issue facing any democratic society. . . . For one 
thing, there is a certain logical dilemma to overcome here. No 
political philosopher and no constitution-makers have ever quite 
succeeded in explaining away this dilemma.60 
An enormous amount of scholarly effort has been dedicated to 
explaining why constitutionalism is not antidemocratic, but the 
problem seems to me less serious than is sometimes imagined. The 
solution lies in recognizing that democracy and constitutionalism 
provide answers to different questions. Democracy is concerned with 
identifying who shall decide political questions, constitutionalism 
with specifying what government permissibly may do. In a 
constitutional democracy, “the people,” directly or through their 
elected representatives, are entitled to make political decisions, but 
the constitution establishes limits on what the state, acting through 
its people, may do. The constitution might provide that the 
government is entitled to act with respect to matters A, B, C, . . . 
and W and further provide that it is not entitled to act with respect 
to matters X, Y, and Z. When the government acts with respect to A, 
it is the people who are entitled to decide the matter. But should a 
majority of the people, acting through their duly-elected 
representatives, adopt some legislation bearing on X, they will have 
exceeded the scope of the government’s legitimate authority. There 
is nothing antidemocratic in saying that the X legislation is 
 
review generally and the deliberative conception of democracy, see Christopher F. Zurn, 
Deliberative Democracy and Constitutional Review, 21 LAW & PHIL. 467 (2002). 
 60. ROBERT K. CARR, MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, DONALD H. MORRISON, RICHARD C. 
SNYDER & JOSEPH E. MCLEAN, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
ESSENTIALS OF NATIONAL, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 29–30 (1955). 
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unconstitutional, for to hold that the people cannot legislate with 
respect to X is only to recognize that X matters lie outside the 
domain of proper state action. Recognizing constitutional limits on 
the government’s authority just acknowledges that certain matters 
are beyond the scope of legitimate governmental action, wherever 
the power of decision making may be vested. It is not to deny the 
principle of democratic decision making with respect to those 
matters as to which the government is entitled to act.61 
This distinction between allocating decision-making authority 
and limiting government power also exists in non-democratic 
settings, and its application there reinforces the conclusion that 
entrenched constitutional rights present a less serious problem for 
democracy than advocates of the countermajoritarian dilemma 
usually claim. In a constitutional monarchy, for example, the 
constitution might both assign political decision-making authority to 
a particular member of the royal family and establish, among other 
constitutional rights, the right to religious freedom. To hold that the 
constitutional monarch does not have the power to forbid citizens’ 
practicing one religion or to compel practicing another does not 
deny the monarch’s political decision-making authority with respect 
to proper governmental functions. Instead, it means only that 
restricting its citizens’ right to worship freely is beyond the limits of 
the state’s legitimate power, something that none of the state’s 
agencies has authority to do. Recognizing a constitutionally 
protected right to religious freedom in a monarchy does not deny 
the principle of monarchical rule but merely imposes a limit on the 
government’s legitimate activity. Thus, in both a democracy and a 
monarchy, constitutional rights merely circumscribe the proper 
domain of the state’s authority. They do not seek to identify the 
agency or branch of the government having decision-making power 
within that domain. 
Whatever one thinks about the merits of this strategy for 
resolving the countermajoritarian dilemma, the apparent conflict 
between constitutionalism and deliberative democracy cannot be 
resolved in this way. Constitutionalism restricts the legitimate sphere 
of government activity: people have certain rights and liberties with 
which the government may not interfere. But deliberative democracy 
 
 61. Of course, this argument presupposes that the constitution itself has a popular 
pedigree. 
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denies that there are matters beyond the ordinary processes of 
political decision making. Deliberative democrats endorse an 
expansive view of deliberation’s domain, believing that all political 
issues that feature deep moral disagreement should be treated 
through deliberation. Although the deliberative democrat may admit 
that government is limited, deliberative democracy holds that the 
nature and content of the principles that limit deliberative decision 
making are themselves proper subjects for citizen deliberation. Both 
the procedural and substantive principles that may constrain 
deliberative decision making are provisional and are to be 
understood as systematically open to revision in an ongoing process 
of both moral and political deliberation. As Gutmann and 
Thompson put it, “Deliberative democracy does not seek a 
foundational principle or set of principles that, in advance of actual 
political activity, determines whether a procedure or law is justified. 
Instead, it adopts a dynamic conception of political justification, in 
which change over time is an essential feature of justifiable 
principles.”62 While constitutional democracy imposes constraints on 
democratic decision making that place some matters outside the 
bounds of ordinary democratic processes, deliberative democracy 
holds that any matter may properly be subjected to the deliberative 
process, including what procedural and substantive rights should 
constrain the decision-making process. 
B. Constitutional Rights as the Products of Public Deliberation 
Deliberative constitutionalists might try to reconcile deliberative 
and constitutional principles by claiming that deliberative processes 
will produce the same set of individual rights and liberties that 
constitutionalism recognizes. This argument might take two forms. 
It might be cast as a prediction that the actual deliberations among 
citizens, conducted under suitable conditions, will result in the 
recognition of the full panoply of constitutional rights. Alternatively, 
the argument could be framed as a claim that democratic citizens, in 
their deliberations, must appeal to the principles and procedures that 
would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions by free, equal, and 
fully rational beings and that when they do they would identify the 
full set of individual rights and liberties that constitutionalism would 
 
 62. WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 29, at 132; see id. at 6–7, 57–59, 
110–19, 121–22. 
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protect. But neither of these strategies can successfully integrate 
constitutional and deliberative principles. The first compromises an 
essential ingredient of constitutionalism, the second an important 
feature of the most appealing versions of deliberative democracy. 
The first strategy depends on the wildly improbable empirical 
claim that actual citizens motivated by justice or the common good 
and willing to abide by democratic decisions regarding these values 
in fact will respect the individual rights and liberties that 
constitutionalists recommend, at least so long as the social 
conditions conducive to satisfactory deliberation for public 
deliberation are in place. At the level of practical implementation, the 
proponent of this strategy must believe that the happy confluence of 
appropriately motivated citizens and suitable social conditions can be 
realized often enough and consistently enough to guarantee the 
protection of constitutional rights and liberties. Of course, part of 
what motivates the constitutionalist to impose institutional 
constraints on ordinary political processes is a concern about the 
extent to which ambition, self-interest, prejudice, irrationality, and 
other factors will perniciously affect the outcomes of actual political 
processes, deliberative or otherwise. This difference between 
deliberative and constitutional democracy, therefore, might just 
reflect conflicting assumptions about human nature and about the 
prospects for realizing social conditions congenial to proper 
deliberation. But it certainly does entail very different 
recommendations about which political institutions are required for 
individual rights to be protected. The proponent of this harmonizing 
strategy must believe that the prospects of having properly motivated 
citizens and suitably arranged social conditions are likely enough for 
rights and liberties to be respected, whereas the constitutionalist 
believes that those rights and liberties must be insulated from the 
vagaries of everyday politics to assure that they are respected. Thus, 
this strategy seems to leave unresolved the conflicting practical 
recommendations that constitutional and deliberative democracy 
make about the kinds of political institutions democracy requires. 
But this conflict at the level of practical implementation simply 
reflects the more serious reason why claiming that the actual 
deliberations of democratic citizens will respect constitutional rights 
fails to harmonize constitutional and deliberative principles. This 
approach accepts deliberative democracy’s commitment to subjecting 
every question of legal, political, and social policy to the deliberative 
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process. It thereby accords priority to democratic decision making 
over individual rights. By contrast, constitutionalism requires 
institutional constraints on democratic processes that put decisions 
affecting certain basic rights and liberties beyond the reach of the 
popular will. It thereby gives priority to those individual rights and 
liberties over democratic decision making. To claim that the actual 
deliberations of properly motivated citizens under suitable conditions 
will respect constitutional rights does not reconcile constitutionalism 
and deliberative democracy. Instead, it simply chooses deliberative 
democracy over constitutionalism. 
The alternative version of this strategy—that hypothetical 
deliberations will yield constitutional rights—is unsatisfactory for 
reasons internal to the theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democrats are sometimes unclear whether they defend a theoretical 
framework for actual social deliberation or merely a premise for a 
thought-experiment designed to determine what policies would be 
accepted if citizens were to undertake public deliberation under the 
proper conditions. Two prominent writers sometimes associated with 
deliberative democracy—Habermas and Rawls—employ hypothetical 
agreements, and for them the construct of hypothetical agreement 
provides the means for testing whether laws and institutions are just 
and for determining and justifying principles of justice.63 
But most deliberative democrats do not explicitly adopt this kind 
of hypothetical deliberative construct to justify or apply their 
conceptions of democracy. Indeed, what matters for most 
deliberative democrats is not hypothetical deliberation but actual 
deliberation and agreement among citizens under conditions that 
assure their freedom and political equality. Gutmann and 
Thompson’s influential account of deliberative democracy illustrates 
the importance of actual as opposed to hypothetical deliberation.64 
They claim that moral deliberation is inevitably a part of democratic 
discourse, and that democratic deliberation does a better job of 
 
 63. Jurgen Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” relies on a model of uncoerced speech 
that is removed from the influences of power that operate in actual politics. See, e.g., 
HABERMAS, supra note 6. John Rawls’s hypothetical “original position” provides a heuristic 
method for determining what structure of political institutions people would choose behind a 
“veil of ignorance.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–22 (1971). For the 
differences between Habermas and Rawls, see Jurgen Habermas, Reconciliation through the 
Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109 (1995); 
John Rawls, Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995). 
 64. DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 41–43. 
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dealing with moral deliberation than do procedural or constitutional 
democracy.65 From a deliberative perspective, a citizen offers reasons 
to support adoption of some law or policy that are acceptable to 
others who, in turn, are also motivated to find reasons for their 
preferred policies that are acceptable by others.66 This is Gutmann 
and Thompson’s principle of reciprocity. 
An important implication of the reciprocity principle is that 
deliberation—that is, the process of mutual reason-giving among 
suitably motivated citizens—should take place not only in the privacy 
of citizens’ homes or in their solitary reflections but also in public 
political forums.67 Reasoned consensus about the laws and policies 
required by justice or by the common good is a normative ideal that 
actual deliberative democratic processes should approximate as 
closely as possible because the advantages of deliberative democracy 
are realized in actual social interactions, not in hypothetical thought 
experiments.68 For deliberative democrats like Gutmann and 
Thompson, hypothetical justifications like those offered by social 
contract theories are not sufficient to justify imposing laws and social 
policies on citizens.69 Such hypothetical justifications may play a part 
in the moral reasoning that citizens employ in the course of their 
private reflections, but that moral reasoning must be subjected to the 
test of actual deliberation among actual citizens if it is to justify laws 
and institutions to which citizens are subjected. For deliberative 
democratic theories, actual political deliberation is necessary to 
justify laws actually in force and to make them legitimate. Thus, one 
seeking to integrate the insights of constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy must reject any appeal to mere hypothetical deliberation 
in order to preserve the values produced by actual deliberation. 
 
 65. Gutmann and Thompson identify four reasons why deliberative democracy deals 
best with fundamental moral disagreement. Deliberation (1) “contributes to the legitimacy of 
decisions made under conditions of scarcity”; (2) encourages citizens “to take a broader 
perspective on questions of public policy than they might otherwise take”; (3) “clarif[ies] the 
nature of moral conflict, helping to distinguish among the moral, the amoral, and the immoral, 
and between compatible and incompatible values”; and (4) “increases the chances of arriving at 
justifiable policies” over other decision-making procedures. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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C. Public Reason and Constitutional Rights 
Both constitutional democracy and deliberative democracy 
recognize individual rights and liberties but provide different 
justifications for them. The two conceptions of democracy will 
conflict only to the extent that the rights they recognize diverge, so 
one potential strategy for harmonizing them is to show that the sets 
of foundational rights and liberties provided for by constitutionalism 
and by deliberative democracy are coextensive.70 
To understand just what this ambitious strategy must achieve, we 
should recall the differential roles rights play under rival democratic 
theories. Procedural accounts conceive democracy solely as a political 
decision-making process employing majority rule, but procedural 
democrats still must recognize those basic political rights designed to 
ensure that political decisions reflect the popular will.71 
Constitutional democrats recognize political rights that constrain the 
popular will, but they also recognize a robust range of political, civil, 
social, and perhaps economic rights thought basic to the ideal of free 
and equal human beings. The rights associated with constitutional 
democracy include the whole panoply of liberal rights, and these 
rights enjoy priority over democratic processes. Constitutionalism 
does not specify any particular normative theory to justify these 
rights, and their justification is located outside of the political 
process.72 Deliberative democracy might be viewed as a kind of via 
 
 70. Some deliberative democrats argue that deliberation entails a robust set of individual 
rights. For examples, see DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 199–229; WHY 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 29, at 23–26, 102–10, 136–38; HABERMAS, supra 
note 6, at 123; Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, supra note 4, at 185. 
 71. Procedural democrats thus recognize basic political rights like universal franchise 
and the equal right to vote and hold political office. Often they also recognize other political 
rights deemed necessary to establish and to maintain the political decision-making process, 
including freedom of political speech, freedom of the press, the right to form and to join 
political parties, freedom of assembly, the right to present grievances to the government, and 
(in some accounts) certain protection from discrimination against minority groups. See 
generally ELY, supra note 2. 
 72. Such rights often include the freedoms of thought, speech, press, religion, and 
association; the right to hold personal property; a right to liberty and the security of the person 
(including rights against torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment and against 
arbitrary arrest or detention); rights to equality and equal protection of the law; and so on. But 
constitutionalism is not committed to any particular foundational theory to justify these rights. 
The liberal constitutionalist might appeal to a Lockean theory of individual rights that takes 
them as something like moral primitives, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977), or to a Kantian principle that autonomous agents are entitled to equal 
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media between purely procedural conceptions of democracy and 
constitutional accounts.73 Like procedural accounts, deliberative 
democracy does not appeal to any antecedent normative theory to 
justify individual rights and liberties, instead recognizing those rights 
that can be justified from within the theory of deliberative 
democracy, that is, those rights integral to the deliberative decision-
making process itself. But, like constitutional accounts, some 
deliberative conceptions entail not only the relatively limited range of 
procedural rights of political participation, but also those substantive 
liberties and opportunities necessary for citizens to take part in 
democratic deliberation as equals. Deliberative democracy thus may 
defend a robust set of rights, because it requires both political and 
social conditions in which democratic citizens can achieve the status 
of political equals and be capable of identifying and voting for what 
promotes the common good. 
But the prospects for deliberative and constitutional principles 
generating the identical set of political, civil, and social rights do not 
seem promising. For one thing, there is no canonical set of 
individual rights and liberties that constitutionalism requires, so it is 
impossible to say in advance just which rights deliberation must be 
capable of justifying. Must it be capable of generating a right to 
religious freedom? To own private property? To be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure? To confront adverse witnesses in a 
criminal proceeding? Since constitutionalism does not itself specify 
any particular rights, any effort to prescribe some fixed set of 
individual rights and liberties deemed essential to the constitutional 
way of thinking is bound to be ad hoc. Moreover, deliberative 
democrats themselves do not all speak with one voice concerning the 
social and political conditions that must be in place for deliberative 
processes to function properly. Indeed, some do not address the 
question at all. Since both constitutional and deliberative rights are 
so much a function of the particular version of each theory, any 
attempt to describe a general strategy for reconciling 
 
respect, see, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989), or to a 
contractarian theory that derives liberal rights from the hypothetical agreement of rational and 
self-interested persons, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), or even to the 
utilitarian principle that laws and policies should be designed to maximize human happiness or 
welfare. 
 73. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 4, at 39–49. 
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constitutionalism with deliberative democracy by showing that they 
both entail the same set of rights is not likely to succeed. 
More importantly, there is very good reason to think that 
deliberative democracy lacks the resources necessary to generate 
constitutionally entrenched rights. For deliberative democrats, 
political decisions earn their legitimacy by means of the process of 
public deliberation. The idea of public reason requires that 
democratic citizens promote their preferred political outcomes by 
appealing only to reasons that other free and equal citizens can 
reasonably accept. This public reason principle excludes from public 
deliberation considerations peculiar to any particular moral, religious, 
or philosophical perspective. But no matter how robust this principle 
may be, it cannot produce individual rights that are insulated from 
ordinary politics as constitutionalism requires. Although it takes 
some reasons off the political agenda, it still admits the possibility of 
abrogating individual rights a constitutionalist would regard as 
inviolate. 
To see why deliberative democracy cannot produce 
constitutional rights, consider Gutmann and Thompson’s account of 
public reason and the right of religious freedom. Gutmann and 
Thompson’s influential version of deliberative democracy recognizes 
a robust and expansive set of basic rights and liberties, so their 
account of public reason provides an excellent test case.74 Moreover, 
although there is no canonical list of constitutional rights, freedom 
of religion is both widely recognized and reasonably uncontroversial. 
Although it is not a political right, freedom of religion is more 
closely associated with civil rights with a political component (like 
freedom of speech) than are other rights (like private property or 
freedom from arbitrary detention). So, if Gutmann and Thompson’s 
account of deliberative democracy is not capable of generating an 
inviolate right to freedom of religion, then we have a compelling 
reason to doubt that deliberative democracy and constitutional 
democracy are likely to recognize the same rights and liberties. 
As we already have seen, Gutmann and Thompson’s principle of 
reciprocity is fundamental, for it determines the scope of public 
reasons and therefore the kinds of substantive principles belonging in 
a deliberative democratic theory.75 Their reciprocity principle has two 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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requirements, one moral and one empirical. The moral requirement 
provides that “[w]hen citizens make moral claims in a deliberative 
democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by 
fellow citizens who are similarly motivated.”76 Reciprocity demands 
that citizens owe one another justifications for the mutually binding 
laws and public policies they collectively enact. The aim of the 
reciprocity principle is to help citizens seek political agreement on 
the basis of principles that can be justified to other citizens who 
share the aim of reaching such an agreement. It requires that citizens 
or their representatives actually seek to give one another mutually 
acceptable reasons to justify the laws they adopt.77 The empirical 
requirement supplements this understanding. It states: “When moral 
reasoning invokes empirical claims, reciprocity requires that they be 
consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry.”78 Proponents 
of laws, institutions, and policies may not appeal to authority that is 
in principle resistant to the standards of logical consistency or to 
reliable methods of empirical investigation that should be mutually 
acceptable to all citizens. 
Can this reciprocity principle generate an inviolate right to 
religious freedom? To be sure, it does rule out some kinds of 
arguments for the abridgement of religious liberty. Suppose, for 
example, that a religious majority—for example, Roman Catholics—
propose legislation requiring all citizens to be Roman Catholics and 
forbidding the practice of any other religion. The argument offered 
in support of this religious legislation is that Roman Catholicism is 
the one true religion, and the evidence adduced in support of this 
claim is the testimony of the Holy Scriptures and the teachings and 
traditions of the Church. Such an argument surely will fail the 
reciprocity test, for the reasons given would not be “mutually 
acceptable.” A citizen who does not already share a commitment to 
the Roman Catholic faith would not find appeals to its authoritative 
writings and teachings relevant; they would not count as the kinds of 
reasons he could accept and so would violate the reciprocity 
restriction. Gutmann and Thompson themselves seem to have this 
kind of argument in mind when they conclude that “any claim fails 
to respect reciprocity if it imposes a requirement on other citizens to 
 
 76. Id. at 55. 
 77. Id. at 52–55. 
 78. Id. at 56. 
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adopt one’s sectarian way of life as a condition of gaining access to 
the moral understanding that is essential to judging the validity of 
one’s moral claims.”79 Thus, a legislative initiative curtailing freedom 
of religion would be foreclosed by the reciprocity principle to the 
extent that it depends on arguments making essential reference to 
the content of a particular religious faith. 
But now suppose proponents of the legislation make a different 
kind of argument. The Roman Catholic majority propose legislation 
compelling conversion to Roman Catholicism and banning other 
religious practices by appealing not to the tenets of Roman 
Catholicism but instead to principles of civic republicanism. One 
function of government, they argue, is to preserve social stability and 
to promote social cohesion and cooperation. One, perhaps the best, 
way to achieve these goals is to establish a strong, unified moral and 
religious code that binds together the disparate elements of the 
political community. Their reasoning might resemble that of Justice 
Felix Frankfurter in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.80 The case 
involved two children of Jehovah’s Witnesses expelled from public 
school for refusing to salute the flag as required by a state statute.81 
The parents challenged the flag salute statute on the grounds that it 
violated their religious beliefs; but, in an opinion by Justice 
Frankfurter, the Court upheld the legislation as a legitimate way to 
cultivate the identity of citizens as a community. 
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of 
cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those 
agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the 
traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to 
generation, and thereby create the continuity of a treasured 
common life which constitutes a civilization.82 
Supporters of the hypothetical religious legislation might argue that 
its purpose is like the purpose Frankfurter identified for the flag 
salute statute: to promote a unity of spirit among the citizenry and to 
inculcate feelings of loyalty and commonality that will bind fellow 
 
 79. Id. at 57. 
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 81. Id. at 591–92. 
 82. Id. at 596. 
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citizens to one another.83 What motivates the choice of Roman 
Catholicism as the religion to achieve this unifying purpose is that, 
since the majority of citizens already are Roman Catholics, fewer 
people will be inconvenienced by the legislative mandate. 
This civic republican argument for abridging religious freedom 
appears to satisfy Gutmann and Thompson’s reciprocity principle. 
The argument contains four premises: (1) a proper function of 
government is to promote social cohesion; (2) a single religious 
practice has a certain efficacy in achieving that goal; (3) minimizing 
“inconvenience” to citizens is an appropriate basis for choosing 
among competing social policies; and (4) compelling conversion to 
the majority religion minimizes personal and social disruption. 
Certainly none of these claims requires citizens to adopt any 
particular sectarian view in order to gain an appreciation of the 
moral, political, or factual claim being asserted. To the contrary, each 
of them is “accessible to others,” just because it is the kind of 
“mutually acceptable” reason that can be accepted by a citizen who 
is motivated to find reasons that are acceptable to others. Premises 
(1) and (3) certainly are normative claims, but they appeal to values 
that could be accepted by all citizens. In this respect, they represent 
claims that can be assessed and accepted by persons who are sincerely 
committed to any number of religious or secular ways of life. 
Premises (2) and (4) are empirical claims, but they surely are 
“consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry.”84 For 
example, whether compulsory establishment of a single religion 
promotes social cohesion in a morally and religiously pluralistic 
society seems to be the kind of factual question that standard 
anthropological, sociological, and historical methods of inquiry are 
suited to answer. The civic republican argument may be deeply 
flawed; one or more of its premises may be false, or the argument 
may fail to take into account other relevant considerations. But the 
reciprocity principle allows it a place in the public’s deliberations, 
and a popular majority might be persuaded by it. 
If these observations are right, then one important, well-
developed, and influential version of deliberative democracy that 
recognizes a rich array of traditional liberal rights cannot guarantee a 
right to religious freedom that is invulnerable to ordinary politics. 
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Since that right is one of the relatively uncontroversial liberal rights 
recognized by constitutionalists, there is at least one very important 
point of divergence between the deliberative and constitutional 
versions of democracy. We also may suspect that, if deliberation is 
not rich enough to generate an inviolate right of religious freedom, 
it also may not have the capacity for generating other well-
established constitutional rights. In short, it appears that the strategy 
for accommodating constitutionalism and deliberative democracy by 
appealing to the identity of constitutional and deliberative rights 
cannot succeed. 
Before concluding this section, I should draw attention to an 
additional feature of deliberative democracy that undermines the 
identity of rights strategy. Deliberative democracy takes the view that 
all principles are provisional and subject to revision by means of the 
deliberative process. This commitment to provisionality requires that 
deliberative democracy subject its own principles, as well as other 
moral principles, to critical scrutiny. Thus, the possibility of revision 
applies not only to the substantive principles that deliberative 
democracy might generate, but also to the practice of deliberation 
itself. The principle of deliberation calling for the giving of moral 
reasons in public is not beyond reasonable disagreement, and some 
might claim that self-interested bargaining is superior to deliberative 
politics as a method for resolving moral and political disagreement. 
This is the kind of moral claim that should satisfy the reciprocity 
principle; and, should it carry the day, a democratic majority might 
choose to abandon deliberative decision-making processes in favor of 
interest-oriented bargaining. The implication of this feature for our 
present inquiry is this: even if the concept of deliberation were 
capable of generating a set of substantive rights and liberties that 
mirrored those recognized by constitutionalism, the deliberative 
principle itself is not immune from abrogation within everyday 
politics. If public deliberation and the reciprocity principle are 
vulnerable to the popular will, then whatever substantive rights that 
inhere in them are similarly vulnerable. As a consequence, even if the 
public reason principle had the resources necessary to produce an 
inviolate right to religious freedom (or any other constitutional 
right), its own vulnerability means that it cannot insulate individual 
rights and liberties from everyday politics in the way that 
constitutionalism requires. 
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D. Deliberation and Constitutional Moments 
Deliberative constitutionalists might seek to harmonize 
deliberative and constitutional principles by confining deliberative 
processes exclusively to occasions for constitution making. Although 
constitutionalism presupposes that individuals have rights that 
government should not abridge and seeks to protect those rights by 
creating entrenched legal rules, it says nothing about the processes 
by which those constitutional limitations are adopted in the first 
instance. In addition, constitutionalism admits to the possibility of 
constitutional amendment by some extraordinary legal or political 
mechanism operating outside routine majoritarian politics. 
Deliberative democrats therefore might avoid the conflict 
between constitutional and deliberative principles by claiming that 
deliberation guided by public reason should not be the normal mode 
of governmental decision making but instead should be limited to 
constitutional affairs. There will be no inconsistency between 
constitutional principles and deliberative democracy if deliberative 
democratic processes operate only within original constitutional 
conventions and constitution-amending proceedings and not within 
ordinary, day-to-day political processes. Democratic deliberation 
over what individual rights should constrain state action that takes 
place only within the founding constitutional convention or within 
the constitutionally prescribed amendatory process does not offend 
the constitutional tenet that such rights be immune to revision by 
ordinary legislative or other political processes. 
In fact, some writers committed to both the values of 
constitutionalism and to those of deliberation are willing to restrict 
deliberation to constitution-making occasions. For example, Bruce 
Ackerman’s dualist account of American constitutional democracy 
distinguishes between normal politics, in which the government 
makes decisions, and higher lawmaking, in which the people make 
decisions.85 Ackerman recognizes that neither citizens nor their 
elected representatives are always or solely motivated by private 
advantage when conducting normal politics.86 Nevertheless, people 
engaged in the processes of ordinary political decision making are 
often apathetic, ignorant, and selfish.87 By contrast, the processes 
 
 85. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 230–65. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
WORLEY.MRO 3/13/2009 9:17 AM 
431 Deliberative Constitutionalism 
 471 
associated with higher lawmaking provide the kind of deliberative 
forums that support widespread and sustained public consideration 
of measures in terms of their contribution to the public good.88 On 
this dualist account, only transformative national crises like the 
Constitutional Founding, the Civil War, and the New Deal can and 
do elicit deliberation among the American people as a whole. 
But Ackerman’s reason for limiting deliberative processes to such 
“constitutional moments” is not to preserve the conceptual 
consistency between constitutional and deliberative principles, but to 
avoid the practical limitations associated with deliberation. He 
recognizes that private citizens have other values and interests—
family, friends, work, religion, hobbies, civic activities, and the like—
that make legitimate claims on their time and energy, so that the 
capacity to deliberate concerning the public good is a scarce 
resource. So, for Ackerman, reasons of economy dictate that most 
public policy issues and most lawmaking occasions cannot and 
should not be subjected to deliberative processes. 89 
In any event, this two-track approach limiting democratic 
deliberation to constitution-founding and constitution-amending 
events cannot solve the conceptual problem with which we are 
concerned, for it purchases consistency at too high a price for 
deliberative democracy. The most robust versions of deliberative 
democracy hold that deliberation should orient and pervade all 
institutions, certainly all political institutions, at all times. Gutmann 
and Thompson, for example, emphasize the importance of 
deliberation in the ongoing processes of routine political activity, 
what they call “middle democracy.” 
It is in middle democracy that much of the moral life of a 
democracy, for good or ill, is to be found. This is the land of 
everyday politics, where legislators, executives, administrators, and 
judges make and apply policies and laws, sometimes arguing among 
 
 88. Id. at 266–94. David Gauthier also defends a dualist view in which deliberation 
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self-interest. See David Gauthier, Constituting Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 314 
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 89. As Ackerman puts it, “Quite simply, American citizens don’t work equally hard all 
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themselves, sometimes explaining themselves and listening to 
citizens, other times not. Middle democracy is also the land of 
interest groups, civic associations, and schools, in which adults and 
children develop political understandings, sometimes arguing 
among themselves and listening to people with differing points of 
view, other times not. It is a land that democrats can scarcely afford 
to bypass. A democratic theory that is to remain faithful to its 
moral premises and aspirations for justice must take seriously the 
need for moral argument within these processes and appreciate the 
moral potential of such deliberation.90 
The high value deliberative democrats ascribe to deliberation 
explains why it cannot be relegated only to constitutional founding 
and amending events. To be sure, deliberative democrats value 
deliberation for different reasons. Some emphasize its epistemic 
reliability. They contend that public deliberation should be the 
governing ideal for democratic politics, because it is the best or the 
only means available for ascertaining the truth about the common 
good and for establishing laws and policies that best promote it. 
Others identify deliberative decision making in a democracy as a 
basic moral ideal. They hold that public deliberation about the 
common good is a basic feature of a well-ordered society, because it 
is part of “an independent and expressly political ideal that is focused 
in the first instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs—on, 
that is, the appropriate ways of arriving at collective decisions.”91 
Still, other deliberative democrats appeal to the idea of public reason 
and claim that institutional principles must be justifiable in terms 
acceptable to free and equal citizens. For them, public deliberation is 
a requirement of political legitimacy. Governmental action must be 
justifiable according to considerations all citizens can reasonably 
accept if it is to respect their political autonomy, and a deliberative 
democracy increases the prospects that political power will be 
exercised consistently with these public reasons. 
However much these accounts may differ in where they locate 
the value of deliberation, confining it to the domain of constitutional 
politics would deprive deliberative democracy of one of its central 
insights. Any theory of deliberative democracy that limits 
deliberation to constitutional moments will deprive everyday politics 
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of their epistemically most reliable foundations or will leave them to 
offend against an important moral ideal or will render them 
politically illegitimate, depending on the justificatory argument on 
which it is grounded. For deliberative democrats, deliberation is too 
valuable for it to be excluded from the processes of ordinary political 
activity. Limiting its role only to constitution-making events 
therefore entails too great a sacrifice. 
E. Constitutional Entrenchment and Deliberative Amendment 
Having considered several unsuccessful strategies for reconciling 
constitutionalism with deliberative democracy, we now turn to how 
that reconciliation can be accomplished. To recapitulate, the 
problem confronting the deliberative constitutionalist is that 
constitutionalism stipulates that some matters, like those involving 
certain fundamental rights, are simply beyond the reach of the 
popular will acting within ordinary political processes, while 
deliberative democracy requires that all procedural and substantive 
principles of political morality are subject to consideration and 
revision within deliberative democratic processes. The solution to 
this apparent dilemma recognizes that constitutional and deliberative 
principles converge at the very point at which they are in tension. 
Constitutionalism insulates individual rights from “the vicissitudes of 
political controversy,” but it does not require their being entirely 
immune to revision. Conversely, deliberative democracy treats 
individual rights as morally and politically provisional, but it does not 
require that every principle of rights or justice be subjected to 
endless reconsideration and alteration. 
Consider the first point. Constitutionalism puts fundamental 
rights outside the range of everyday politics, because they must be 
entrenched beyond any alteration that could be effected by the 
ordinary expression of political will if they are to function as effective 
limits on legislative and other exercises of governmental power. But 
that constitutional provisions must be difficult to change does not 
entail that they must be impervious to change. After all, 
constitutions are human contrivances; and, since human beings are 
fallible and susceptible to error, both the normative and empirical 
judgments on which constitutional principles are built may prove to 
be mistaken. The fundamental moral and political value judgments 
underlying the original constitutional configuration could change, so 
that the existing constitutional instrument no longer expresses the 
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most deeply held convictions of the people it governs. Moreover, 
citizens’ perceptions of appropriate social goals and of institutional 
efficacy may change, so that what seems reasonable, desirable, and 
constitutionally required at one time may appear unsound or 
otherwise inappropriate at another. Furthermore, changes in social, 
political, or economic conditions may render the constitutional 
instrument obsolete as a means for achieving its fundamental 
purposes; or executive, legislative, or judicial decisions rendered 
within the constitutional order may have produced unanticipated ill 
effects that require remediation. Constitutionalism thus recognizes a 
power to alter or amend the provisions of the constitutional 
instrument. To be sure, it entrenches certain basic political 
institutions and individual rights, but it does so only to insulate them 
from the processes of everyday political decision making. The 
constitutional entrenchment principle leaves room for modifying 
constitutional limitations on the popular will, for all it requires is that 
constitutional rules may be modified or repealed only by recourse to 
a special, extraordinary, and more onerous amendatory procedure 
and not by the normal legislative process. 
The provision for modification or amendment is not just a 
principle of constitutional theory but also a pervasive feature of 
constitutional practice. The constitutional text of every major nation 
expressly provides some mechanism for its own amendment, 
although the degree of difficulty in effecting an amendment varies 
widely among the various constitutional instruments. Two of the 
most deeply entrenched and difficult to amend constitutions are 
those of the United States and Australia. In the United States, a 
constitutional amendment requires passage by two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress and ratification by the legislatures or conventions 
in three-fourths of the states, or two-thirds of the state legislatures 
calling for a convention to propose amendments followed by the 
approval of three-fourths of the state legislatures or conventions.92 
The Australian Constitution requires that amendments be approved 
by both chambers of Parliament or by either chamber twice, 
followed by ratification by a nationwide majority of voters and by a 
majority of voters in a majority of each of the states and territories.93 
By contrast, some constitutions make amendments only slightly 
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more difficult to enact than ordinary legislation. The Polish 
Constitution, for example, requires that amendments “be adopted by 
the House of Representatives by a majority of at least two-thirds of 
votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of 
Deputies, and by the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the 
presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators;”94 while 
the Hungarian Constitution requires only the affirmative votes of 
“two thirds of the Members of Parliament” to approve an 
amendment.95 Just how deeply entrenched any particular 
constitution should be will presumably be a function of the social, 
political, economic, and cultural conditions prevailing in the 
adopting state.96 But the hallmark of constitutionalism is that there is 
a difference between the procedures by which ordinary legislation 
may be adopted and those relatively more demanding procedures by 
which the constitution may be modified, and even those modern 
constitutions providing for relatively lax amendatory procedures 
observe this distinction. 
But deliberative democracy is no more committed to endless 
revisability than constitutionalism is to irreversible entrenchment. In 
part, deliberative democracy regards popular decisions as provisional 
for the same reasons constitutions provide for their own amendment: 
our knowledge and understanding are incomplete, our decision-
making institutions imperfect. But its public reason principle and the 
idea of reciprocity also entail that democratic decisions be 
provisional. As we have seen, deliberative democrats require citizens 
to justify the laws they impose on one another by appealing to 
reasons that free and equal citizens can reasonably accept. To treat 
others as equals in the decision-making process, citizens are 
obligated to provide reasons for the laws, institutions, and policies 
that affect them, which they can regard as acceptable from the 
perspective of their differing moral, religious, and philosophical 
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views. Just as citizens must give only reasons others could reasonably 
accept, so also they must be receptive to similarly acceptable reasons 
offered by their fellow deliberators and must acknowledge that the 
view they reject today may prove right tomorrow. 
The process of mutual reason-giving further implies that each of 
the participants involved should take seriously new evidence and 
arguments, new interpretations of old evidence and arguments, 
including moral reasons offered by those who oppose their 
decisions, and reasons they may have rejected in the past. . . . One 
implication is that citizens and their accountable representatives 
should continue to test their own political views, seeking forums in 
which their views can be challenged, and keeping open the 
possibility of their revision or even rejection.97 
This openness to revision or rejection over time required by the 
process of mutual reason-giving allows that some issues of social or 
political policy will be more firmly settled than others. It certainly 
does not demand that citizens perpetually revisit every decision. 
Once a matter has been submitted to deliberative processes, citizens 
may properly determine that it has been more or less conclusively 
resolved and should be removed from the active political agenda. 
Deliberative citizens might be expected to conclude that there is 
little reason anytime soon to reconsider whether slavery should be 
prohibited or whether all adult citizens should have the right to vote 
or whether persons should be permitted to worship as they see fit. 
Where all the known arguments have been fully considered, the most 
compelling moral reasons line up on one side of the issue, and the 
relevant empirical issues are not open to serious dispute, deliberation 
may produce a near-universal consensus about what justice requires 
or what rights people should have. In such cases deliberative citizens 
also may determine that one or more of the reasons for 
constitutional entrenchment are implicated, so that the decision they 
reach should be put beyond the reach of normal politics and not be 
vulnerable to change without recourse to the more demanding 
processes in place for constitutional amendment. For other matters—
in our times, abortion and same-sex marriage may be such cases—the 
weight of moral reasons on all sides of the issue, the widespread 
disagreement remaining after deliberation, and the uncertainty about 
important biological or sociological questions might well lead 
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citizens committed to the value of reciprocity and the process of 
mutual reason-giving to conclude that any political decision should 
remain fully provisional. For our present purposes the essential point 
is that the deliberative democrat’s commitment to provisionality is 
compatible with the constitutional entrenchment principle. 
Recognizing that constitutional principles allow for amendment 
by extraordinary means and that deliberative principles admit to 
treating some moral and political decisions as settled opens up space 
within which constitutionalism and deliberative democracy may 
operate without conflict. For them to do so, the deliberative 
democrat must acknowledge this modest limitation on provisionality; 
namely, that the various restraints provided by constitutionalism—
including constitutionally protected individual rights—be amenable 
to revision only by means of the extraordinary processes specified by 
the constitution and not by means of the ordinary processes by 
which routine political decisions are made. This more modest version 
of deliberative democratic principles leaves plenty of opportunity for 
deliberative processes to operate. Citizens may engage in public 
deliberation with respect to all ordinary legislation, institutions, and 
social policies. Democratic deliberation also may take place with 
respect to whether to initiate the constitution-amending process; 
and, once the amendatory process begins, deliberative decision-
making principles may guide citizens in determining whether to 
modify the set of constitutionally specified governmental powers, 
reconfigure the political arrangements that operate as constraints on 
the exercise of those powers, or redefine the fundamental rights and 
liberties that demarcate the limits of appropriate governmental 
action. But what the deliberative constitutionalist cannot coherently 
permit is the alteration or abrogation of those constitutionally 
entrenched powers, institutions, processes, and individual rights 
without making use of the comparatively more onerous procedures 
required for constitutional amendment. Consistency between 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy can be achieved, but 
only so long as constitutionally protected rights cannot be curtailed 
or eliminated by means of routine deliberative politics. 
This strategy preserves consistency between the principles of 
deliberative democracy and constitutionalism without compromising 
either the values that deliberation is said to promote or the purposes 
for which constitutional entrenchment is designed to achieve. 
Democratic citizens and other political actors will engage in public 
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discussion and mutual reason-giving both in normal political 
decision making and in the constitutional amendatory process. The 
values of deliberation—its epistemic reliability, its contribution to the 
ideals of a well-ordered society, or its role in sustaining political 
legitimacy—therefore will be present in both normal and 
constitutional politics. Constitutionally entrenched institutional 
structures, political processes, and individual rights whose function is 
to constrain government action will remain subject to deliberative 
democratic processes, just as the deliberative democrat insists; but 
those constraints will be amenable to alteration or elimination only 
at the level of constitutional politics and not at the level of routine 
politics. Although constitutional rights will be vulnerable to change 
by the people deliberating, requiring recourse to the relatively more 
demanding processes in place for constitutional amendment renders 
them no more vulnerable to the impulsive behavior of popular 
majorities and the self-serving conduct of government officials than 
constitutionalism itself already allows. 
V. CONCLUSION 
My goal in this Article has been modest. I have not set out to 
justify either constitutionalism or deliberative democracy or to show 
that the deliberative constitutionalist project successfully exploits the 
strengths of each without falling victim to the weaknesses of either. 
Instead, I have sought only to discover whether constitutional and 
deliberative principles can be coherently integrated and have found 
that they can. Nevertheless, the three principal conclusions produced 
by this inquiry have implications for the deliberative constitutionalist 
project. 
First, deliberative democracy’s requirement that citizens and 
other political actors seek to adopt laws and policies calculated to 
promote the common good does not conflict with constitutionalism 
because constitutionalism is not necessarily committed to the view 
that political actors should act to promote individual or group 
interest when doing so. Since the most plausible justifications for 
democracy built on constitutional foundations are non-utilitarian, 
constitutional democrats will readily reject the preference-
aggregating model of democratic decision making that would 
produce a contradiction. Accordingly, deliberative constitutionalism 
can retain the common good principle, since constitutional 
democracy is more compatible with political actors being obligated 
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to promote the common good than it is with their pursuing their 
self-interested goals. 
Second, deliberative democracy’s preference transformation 
principle coheres with constitutionalism, because any democratic 
theory will be entirely indifferent to whether the self-interested 
preferences of citizens remain fixed or be open to change during 
their political interactions, so long as that theory requires political 
decision makers to promote their judgments of the common good 
rather than their own self-interest. The common good principle 
makes the preference transformation principle an entirely expendable 
feature of deliberative democracy, despite the prominent place the 
latter has in many deliberative democratic accounts. Moreover, the 
preference transformation principle poses no logical obstacle for the 
deliberative constitutionalist project, since whether citizens’ self-
interested preferences remain fixed or mutable will also be irrelevant 
for any constitutional account holding that political actors should be 
motivated by the common good. Although the preference 
transformation principle poses no risk of contradiction with 
constitutional principles, it is superfluous. Therefore, a deliberative 
constitutionalist theory of democracy—indeed, for that matter, any 
deliberative democratic theory—can abandon it without loss. 
Finally, deliberative democracy’s public reason principle and its 
corollary holding that all procedural and substantive issues, including 
what individual rights should be regarded as fundamental, are 
provisional and open to revision pursuant to deliberative processes 
do not contradict constitutionalism’s commitment to the 
entrenchment of individual rights. The purpose of 
constitutionalism’s entrenchment principle is to remove decisions 
about fundamental rights from the ordinary political arena. 
Nevertheless, constitutional entrenchment is compatible with 
altering or abrogating even the most fundamental rights, provided it 
can be accomplished only by means of the comparatively more 
rigorous and exacting procedures established for amending the 
constitution. At the same time, deliberative democracy is amenable 
to treating some deliberative decisions as reasonably settled. 
Although deliberative democracy’s public reason principle entails 
that political actors must be prepared to recognize that a decision 
reached at one time may have been wrong and so must be open to 
revision, this commitment to provisionality does not foreclose the 
possibility of treating some political decisions as revisable only by 
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means of those extraordinary amendatory processes. Matters of 
public policy as to which the empirical and moral issues appear to be 
well settled and not subject to reasonable disagreement may be 
suitable for constitutional entrenchment. The apparent contradiction 
between deliberative democracy’s commitment of provisionality and 
constitutionalism’s commitment to entrenched rights can be 
dissolved, therefore, if deliberative constitutionalism recognizes that 
constitutionally protected rights reside outside the domain of 
ordinary politics and may be abrogated or modified only by those 
means established for amending the constitution. This modest 
proviso to deliberative democratic principles should be 
unobjectionable to both deliberative and constitutional democrats, 
for it fully preserves the benefits of deliberation without 
undermining the purposes of constitutional entrenchment. Indeed, 
this minor concession to constitutional principles is compatible with 
the spirit of accommodation and compromise, which are the 
hallmarks of deliberative democratic theory. 
